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LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN, FRONTIER WATCH AND WARD COMMITTEE,  
No. F.-10-F. C./36, DATED NEW DELHI, THE 5TH DECEMBER 1936.

I have the honour to submit the report (in duplicate) of the Frontier  
Watch and Ward Committee.

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## PART I.

### INTRODUCTORY.

1. Our Committee was appointed in March 1936 to examine the expenditure relating to Watch and Ward on the North West Frontier, but owing to various circumstances it was not able to assemble until November 1st, when it commenced work in Quetta.

2. *Terms of Reference.*—Our terms of reference were :—

“In the light of the Order-in-Council of 17th July 1933 and the subsequent correspondence on the subject—

- (a) to examine and report to what extent the recommendations of the Howell Committee, as approved by the Government of India, have been carried out by the North West Frontier Administration with particular regard to the incidence of Watch and Ward expenditure;
- (b) to recommend to what extent further reductions of expenditure are possible and desirable in—
  - (i) the near future; and
  - (ii) the more distant future;
- (c) to examine the existing procedure for the placing of all contracts for works and supplies in the Tribal areas of the North West Frontier and report on the procedure to be adopted for the future;
- (d) to report on the permanent strength of gazetted and superior non-gazetted posts required in Tribal areas.”

The relevant portions of the Order-in-Council, to which reference is made, run as follows :—

- “(c) that the Agent to the Governor General, North West Frontier Province should examine the question of effecting any possible reduction in the strength of the Scouts, and also the question of effecting economies in their internal administration;
- (d) that the maximum reduction of the Frontier Constabulary be undertaken as soon as possible with the eventual object of their total elimination;
- (e) that eventual reduction of Khassadari should be expressly accepted as one of the objectives of our frontier policy;
- (f) that the possibility of colonising Pathans in other parts of India should be considered.”

The scope of our enquiries was to include Baluchistan as well as the North-West Frontier Province. We were also asked to report on three specific questions, (a) the proposed increase of the Chagai Levies, (b) the protection of the Tanai-Fort Sandeman road, and (c) the necessity for a Civil Serai and hospital at Ladha.

3. After examining witnesses in Baluchistan we proceeded by road through Waziristan to Peshawar, and thence, with a halt of one night in Rawalpindi, to New Delhi. The evidence of witnesses was not recorded. We take this opportunity of thanking all local officers for the assistance they rendered in our enquiry.

## PART II.

## NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE.

4. For the sake of clarity we have combined our examination of the first two of our terms of reference.

5. *Scouts. Kurram Militia.*—Strength—5 British Officers, 1289 Other Ranks.

Annual cost—Rs. 6,52,352.

*Tochi Scouts.*—Strength—11 British Officers, 2183 Other Ranks.

Annual cost—Rs. 12,75,218.

*South Waziristan Scouts.*—Strength—14 British Officers, 2784 Other Ranks.

Annual cost—Rs. 16,96,388.

*Chitral Scouts.*—Strength—2 British Officers, 987 Other Ranks.

Annual cost—Rs. 78,594.

The strengths shown are of combatant personnel only: the costs are the actuals of the year 1935-36.

6. The first three are whole-time Corps of the same nature and are employed in the control of tribal areas. The Kurram Militia differs from the other two in its local enlistment, and to some extent in its duties, but is identical in organisation and administration.

7. The Chitral Scouts are less highly organised and are called up for one month's training only a year. Their rôle is to provide the first resistance to an attack on Chitral. They can be embodied quickly and are very mobile. The direct employment under Government of State subjects emphasizes Government's close concern in State affairs, and makes for political stability. The normal cost of the Chitral Scouts is about Rs. 70,000: certain abnormal features have inflated the cost in the last few years, but will now disappear. No change has been made in the strength of the Corps since 1931.

8. In the other three Corps there has been a net decrease of 95 men since 1931, and this with other economies has resulted in a saving of Rs. 2,85,017 per annum. This economy Colonel Erskine has been able to secure without loss of efficiency as a result of a detailed examination of the contingent charges of the Corps extending over the last two years. He does not however think that this method will yield any further appreciable economy, and it must therefore be sought in a reduction of strength or pay, or efficiency. It has not been suggested to us that any reduction of strength is possible, and we think that these Corps are fully employed on the duties which have been assigned to them. To impair their efficiency by a reduction of expenditure on equipment, training, transport or other services would, in our opinion, be a false economy. In these two respects therefore we recommend no reduction.

9. The basic pay of these Corps, as of the Frontier Constabulary, is Rs. 15 *plus* Rs. 6 ration allowance. This does not appear to us to be capable of reduction. To the two Waziristan Corps there has been given from the outset special pay, the basic rate of which is Rs. 5 in the South Waziristan Scouts and Rs. 3 in the Tochi Scouts, as compensation for their more strenuous duties and harder conditions of service. In the Kurram Militia the men are serving a few miles from their homes in a friendly country.

In the Frontier Constabulary they are serving in the administered districts nearer their homes and are not called upon to face such constant danger as in the Waziristan Corps. This difference in conditions remains the same as it always was, and in South Waziristan a large portion of the Corps will still be housed in temporary camps for many years to come. The differentiation appears to us to be justified. Colonel Erskine has stated that, if it was absolutely essential, he would be prepared to make a reduction in these allowances of Re. 1 in each case for new entrants. This, he estimates, would eventually effect a saving of Rs. 68,000 per annum. Special pay was introduced when conditions in Waziristan were bad and a definite difficulty was experienced in attracting recruits. Conditions however during the last 15 years have considerably altered especially in North Waziristan, and recruits are no longer really difficult to get. We do not however think that the scale of these allowances is excessive and we are doubtful whether the economy effected by their reduction would justify the disturbance of the present satisfactory conditions. We accordingly recommend that no reduction should be made in the pay and allowances of the men. Mr. Staig, however, feels that as Colonel Erskine's reluctant recommendation applies only to new recruits the risk of repercussion on the efficiency of the Corps in accepting it is not so grave as to warrant the rejection of this measure of economy, and would therefore recommend that effect should be given to it.

10. We do not think that it is possible to make any reduction in the pay of the officers. Quite apart from the question whether the pay is excessive for the duties and responsibility which they undertake, the present difficulty of obtaining officers of the right type and service demands that the attractiveness of the service should not be diminished. Colonel Erskine attributes the difficulty to the smaller number of officers of the Indian Army who are now and will be for some years to come, available for extra-regimental employment, to the greater attraction of the better paid Burma Military Police, to the increase of early marriage, and to the claims of the Staff College. We doubt whether conditions justify higher rates of pay for the Burma Military Police: the other causes are not capable of cure.

11. As for the Chitral Scouts, we are of opinion that they should be retained on the present basis, pending any general reorganisation of the defensive arrangements in that area. The present organisation is on a cheap scale, but provides a very useful force in the event of war, as was amply proved in the Afghan War of 1919. The budget for 1937-38 is however about Rs. 73,000 of which approximately Rs. 30,000 relate to the pay and allowances of the two British Officers. We understand that in the past there have been frequent occasions where one officer has carried on, and we consider that the possibility of making a permanent reduction of one British Officer should be examined.

12. *Frontier Constabulary*.—Strength 15 British Officers, 3527 Other Ranks: annual cost (1935-36) Rs. 18,39,510.

The Frontier Constabulary are chiefly employed within the Administered area of British India to maintain security along its boundary with tribal territory, to prevent raids, to control arms traffic, and deal with the nomad Afghan population that enters India during the winter. The exception is in Sherani tribal territory on the western border of the Dera Ismail Khan district. There, their duties are approximately those of the neighbouring Scouts Corps of Waziristan. On occasions also, detachments are temporarily employed in other portions of tribal territory, as at present in Agra, when tribal formations require stiffening, and there are no regulars or Scouts available.

13. The Corps is divided into 7 units, each under a District Officer, Frontier Constabulary, working, subject to the administrative control of the



Commandant Frontier Constabulary, under the orders of the Deputy Commissioners in whose districts they are stationed. The present distribution is as follows:—

District.	Headquarters.	Infantry platoons.	Mounted Infantry sections.
Hazara . . . . .	Oghi . . . . .	4	1
Peshawar . . . . .	Peshawar . . . . .	13	2
	Shabkadar . . . . .	9	2
Kohat . . . . .	Hangu . . . . .	13	2
Bannu . . . . .	Bannu . . . . .	7	1
Lera Ismail Khan . . . . .	Tank . . . . .	10	2
	Drazinda (Sherani) . . . . .	12	3

The temporary Agra detachment of 4 platoons is found from the Peshawar, Shabkadar and Hangu units, and during the Afridi blockade the two posts of Jola Talao and Nari Khwar on the Peshawar border are being manned by detachments from Hangu. The strength of a platoon has been reduced and is now 43 men, which gives no more than 33 effectives. A section of Mounted Infantry is 12 men.

14. As a result of the orders of the Government of India on the Howell Committee's recommendations, the North West Frontier Province Government, without prejudice to the question of further reductions or final elimination, proposed in 1933 the reduction of 3 Assistant District Officers, 21 platoons of Infantry and 284 Mounted Infantry, to be carried out in three approximately equal instalments. The estimated saving was about Rs. 6 lakhs a year, reduced to 5½ lakhs by provision for a reserve establishment and an increase in mechanical transport. Two instalments had been carried out when, in September 1935, trouble in Agra and on the Hazara border compelled the Government of India to suspend further reductions. The present position is that a reduction in strength of 2 British Officers and 1120 Other Ranks has been effected at a saving of Rs. 5,14,580 a year. The actuals however for 1930-31 were Rs. 22,68,030 and for 1935-36 Rs. 18,39,510, or a difference of Rs. 4,28,520 only. The discrepancy is explained by the fact that in the year 1935-36 a payment of Rs. 81,560 was made on account of the rearmament of the Corps and there was some additional expenditure on the maintenance of the increased mechanical transport. Proposals have recently been made for the further reduction of the Mounted Infantry by 1 Risaldar, 4 Jemadars and 66 men, effecting a saving of Rs. 48,010 per annum. This is practically equivalent to the third instalment of the reduction in Mounted Infantry, which was suspended.

15. Our enquiries do not lead us to think that in any period which we can at present visualize, it will be possible to abolish the Frontier Constabulary altogether. Its proper duties inside the administered districts must still be performed, and the Agent to the Governor General will inevitably require some force to cope with commitments in Tribal Territory, whether permanent as in Sherani country (Drazinda) and to some extent in Agror (Oghi), or temporary as in Agra and the Kajuri plain. The probable opening of the Kagan route to Gilgit for regular traffic will make a further demand on the corps. We do not think that even its duties inside the administered districts can be properly performed by the police, and for the reasons given in the report of the Howell Committee we are opposed to its being placed under the control of the Inspector General of Police.

16. We doubt however whether the Corps is at present organized to the best advantage, either for efficiency or economy. We are of course only

concerned with the former to the extent that it may affect the latter. Some of the considerations which have led us to this opinion are set out below :—

- (a) Overhead charges have not been reduced *pari passu* with rifle strength. There are a Subedar Major, a Jemadar Adjutant, and drill staff in each of the seven units although the total strength in some of them does not exceed 400 men. Recruits are trained separately in each unit, and may not amount to more than 20 or 30 in any place at a time. The full sanctioned strength of British Officers is 15 but has not been employed for some years. Provision exists in the budget for 1936-37 for 13 officers. We are inclined to think that a strength of 12 might be sufficient.
- (b) There are some allowances on a larger scale than those in Scouts Corps, *e.g.*, the equipment allowance of Indian Officers. The scale of practice ammunition might be reduced to 100 rounds a year, as it has been in Scouts Corps.
- (c) There are at present no less than twenty posts with garrisons of one platoon or less. With the existing strength of a platoon this means that no *gasht* (patrol) of any value can be sent out except in the most peaceful conditions. It is doubtful also whether many of these garrisons serve any useful purpose. Instances are, to take one district only, Fort Mackeson, within sight of Aimal Chabutra, Kacha Garhi, a relic of old Khyber Rifle days, and the pumping station for the Kajuri posts, which could be held by chaukidars in times of peace and taken over by Government forces in emergency at a few hours notice.

17. These are only some of the considerations which have emerged from our enquiry, which was necessarily of a most general character, but they seem to us to warrant the opinion that further detailed examination of the organisation of the Frontier Constabulary is required. We are inclined to think that it should be reorganised on a more mobile basis with a single headquarters in which all recruits would be trained, most administration carried out, and ample reserves retained. At the same time most of the small posts would be abolished and detachments only placed in the present unit headquarters sufficient to meet the needs of the moment, and to take advantage of existing accommodation. We suggest the possibility of the headquarters being placed in Hangu and on the Samana, the birth place of the Corps. This would permit the withdrawal of the present regular detachment from Fort Lockhart.

18. *Khassadars and levies. General.*—The proper understanding of the nature of Khassadars and Levies is made more difficult by the fact that not all Khassadars are of the same kind, nor all Levies. And between Khassadars and Levies, the line is not always clearly drawn, so that there may be formations which by their conditions of service should be classed as Levies, and by their responsibilities as Khassadars, and *vice versa*. Two characteristics however may be said to belong to all Khassadars, that they serve as representatives of their tribes and not as individuals, and that they provide their own arms and ammunition. In these two respects they may generally be differentiated from Levies. Further misconception is caused by the common tendency to consider all these formations as exclusively of a military nature. Scarcely ever is this so, and the essential justification for their employment is often to be found in political and economic considerations. Khassadars, for instance, ensure the safety of the roads and make a greater concentration of regular forces possible. But they are also instruments of civil administration, and their employment has been found not only to be a valuable means of enlisting tribal co-operation in the maintenance of law and order but also to provide the best and widest method of distributing the contribution that Government must necessarily make to the income of the tribe in return for the control it exercises over it. From these

few general considerations we may pass to the detailed examination of the duties and conditions of service of each formation, making our recommendations on each, and finally to the general consideration of the Khassadar system as an instrument for carrying out Government's policy. There are instances of formations where the whole or part of the strength is on a temporary basis, and applications for sanction to their retention have to be submitted periodically. In many cases this merely creates unnecessary correspondence. It is as easy to reduce a non-pensionable establishment of this nature if it is permanent as if it is temporary. Where therefore in considering, in the sequel, individual formations, the case for their permanency is in our view established, we have made a recommendation accordingly. The only risk in doing so is that a particular unit may continue when it has outlived its usefulness (*vide* for example our remarks on the Pezu Levies), but this contingency can, we suggest, be best provided for by the submission to the Government of India of a brief quinquennial review of the formations as a whole.

*Note.*—The costs shown are the budget figures of 1936 and do not include the cost of command allowances.

19. *Sherani Guides.*—Strength 15: annual cost Rs. 3,300. There has been an increase of 6 men since 1931.

These are employed in the Sherani tribal territory adjoining Dera Ismail Khan district on the west. Previously Levies were employed in this area, and the tribe was also enlisted in the South Waziristan Militia. Both sources of employment are now gone. Administration, which is now carried out through the agency of Frontier Constabulary (Drazinda) and a small political staff under a Naib Tahsildar, is somewhat closer than, say, in the South Waziristan Agency, and light revenue is collected. Tribal allowances are small. The guides are used to summon tribesmen, to collect information, and to work in liaison with the Frontier Constabulary at each of their posts. Their retention at their present strength appears to us to be necessary. For the 6 men there is only temporary sanction: we recommend that it should be made permanent.

20. *Bhittani Khassadars of Dera Ismail Khan District.*—Strength 326: annual cost Rs. 1,11,200.

These are employed on the same terms as the Khassadars of Waziristan, with a basic pay of Rs. 25 per mensem. Since 1931, there has been a small reduction of Rs. 390 per annum in cost, though as the result of the alteration of the basic rate of pay from Rs. 30 to Rs. 25 and other adjustments within the sanctioned allotment there has been an increase of strength of 51 men, which has been utilised to take over Khirgi post from the regulars.

21. These Khassadars are responsible for the close protection of the road from Khirgi to a few miles beyond Jandola, they are also the instruments of political administration, and they hold posts in their tribal territory north of the road, commanding the main raiding routes. The tribe, which is poor, receives only small allowances of Rs. 9,470 per annum, and this Khassadari service makes an appreciable addition to their income. Since the Khassadars were enlisted the tribe has been well behaved, and it has been possible through their agency to arrest and punish offenders. The economic argument which we develop below in our consideration of the Waziristan Khassadars has great force in the case of the Bhittani tribe. For these reasons we do not think that any reduction of strength or pay is possible in the near future. What may be possible in the more distant future depends on developments in Waziristan proper.

22. *Bhittani Khassadars of Bannu District.*—Strength 60: annual cost Rs. 20,330.

These Khassadars are enlisted from those sections of the Bhittanis who have political relations with Bannu district. Their country lies to the north of that of the Bhittanis of Dera Ismail Khan district. Their duties and conditions of service are of the same nature, except that they have no

road to protect. They are distributed in 3 posts across the administrative border. There has been no change in cost since 1931, but, as elsewhere, their strength has been increased as a result of the reduction of pay. The considerations that apply to the Bhittani Khassadars of Dera Ismail Khan district apply to these Khassadars also, and we recommend no reduction of strength or pay.

23. *Pezu Levies*.—Strength 23: annual cost Rs. 5,000.

These Levies are enlisted from the Marwat tribe to guard the three miles of the main Dera Ismail Khan—Bannu road where it traverses the Pezu Pass. In old days this was the frequent scene of outrages by Mahsud and Bhittani gangs, who were able to approach and escape by the belt of broken hills which stretches on both sides of the pass from the Bhittani hills to the Indus. With the cessation of trans-border raiding the protection of this road would appear to be a responsibility of the Police, and we recommend the disbandment of the Levies. In view of their long and good service we recommend that on discharge they should be given a gratuity of six months' pay.

24. *South Waziristan Khassadars*.—Strength 2712: annual cost Rs. 9,39,200.

Reserve Khassadars 500: annual cost Rs. 36,000.

*North Waziristan Khassadars*.—Strength 2007: annual cost Rs. 7,23,100.

*Wazir Khassadars of Bannu District*.—Strength 1387: annual cost Rs. 1,34,050.

*Biland Khel Khassadars*.—Strength 29: annual cost Rs. 10,200.

Of the South Waziristan Khassadars, the reserve Khassadars and 128 of the embodied Khassadars, costing Rs. 50,400 per annum, are temporary. The latter were sanctioned for the Wana-Ladha and Tanai-Gul Kach roads: they are actually indistinguishable from the permanently sanctioned Khassadars. Since 1931 there have been the increase in strength in South Waziristan mentioned above, and a general increase in all the groups as a result of the reduction of pay from Rs. 30 to Rs. 25. Small reductions in cost have been made amounting to Rs. 1,050 a year; and the following new duties have been undertaken without any increase in personnel:—

- (a) the greater part of the protection of the Wana-Ladha road: no less than 702 men were found from existing personnel;
- (b) the penetration of the Lower Khaisora;
- (c) the strengthening of the Razmak boundary; and
- (d) the taking over of Kotkai and Chegmalai posts from the South Waziristan Scouts.

25. These groups collectively form the Khassadars of Waziristan, and are so closely connected that it would be difficult to treat one group apart from the rest. The right of the tribes from whom they are enlisted to Khassadar service has been confirmed by agreement, but there is no specific agreement as to the extent of the service or the rates of pay.

26. The Khassadars of Waziristan had their origin in the urgent demand of the military authorities in 1921 for some force to relieve regular troops of the duty of protecting their lines of communication from Jandola to Ladha. The force that was raised was modelled on the Khyber Khassadars. Its duties were simply of road protection. The next step was taken with the evacuation of Wana by Government forces, when Wazir and Mahsud Khassadars were enlisted to hold Wana and the way there. It was not till 1922 that the Khassadar system, as we know it now, began to develop. The employment of Khassadars formed an integral part of the arrangement, which Mr. Pears, then Resident in Waziristan, negotiated

with the Wazirs of the North Waziristan Agency and Bannu, for the free passage of Government forces to Razmak and the extension of Government control throughout their area. Meanwhile with the construction of roads and the extension of control in South Waziristan the Khassadar system was further developed there, and it was found possible, step by step, to extend the responsibilities of Khassadars, until throughout Waziristan at the present time they carry out nearly the whole of the everyday duties of political administration. Not only do they provide security, day in day out, on the network of roads which covers Waziristan, but they arrest offenders, bring pressure to bear on recalcitrant sections, stop tribal fighting, and perform, as far as they arise, the many duties carried out by the Police in administered areas. And with it all, the raiding of the administered districts, which was the main cause of Government's occupation of tribal territory, has entirely ceased.

27. These results exceed the most sanguine expectations of the earlier days, but they are not all. Gradually it has been realised that the Khassadar system serves Government's interests in other and perhaps more important ways. With its assumption of a closer control of tribal territory, Government incurred a responsibility, both moral and practical, for the economic condition of the tribes. It restricted some of their activities, which however reprehensible, provided a source of income, and the loss had clearly to be made good to them in some form or other. This was merely a matter of practical expediency. Further than this, it may be argued that Government is morally bound to improve the condition of its subjects, even in areas only partially administered, by affording help in their economic development and by the provision, if only to a small extent, of medical, educational and similar facilities. Government's increasing administration of the tribal area has moreover the inevitable effect of raising the standard of living of the tribes. Mahsuds, who scarcely knew what tea was before, are now accustomed to drink it. They journey to Tank by lorry, whither they used to go on foot; and in a hundred and one ways the normal expenditure of a tribesman has increased. The contribution therefore that Government must make to keep the economic balance steady is likely to increase rather than decrease. This economic argument, though specially applicable to the Mahsuds, is true, more or less, for all the tribes of Waziristan.

28. The contribution may be made in several ways, by direct payments as by allowances, by development of the natural resources of the country, by provision of land outside the country for colonisation, by employment on the construction of public works, and by direct Government employment. The payment of allowances is necessary, providing as it does the framework of our relations with the tribes, but it cannot be profitably increased; our experience leads us to believe that little development of the natural resources of the country is possible; colonisation has been tried on a small scale, but its efficacy is a matter of dispute; very few public works are now being carried out. It appears therefore that the contribution must be mainly made through the provision of direct employment. Mahsuds are enlisted in small numbers in the regular army and the Kurram Militia, but their chief employment is found in Khassadari service.

29. In Khassadari service there are special advantages. A payment made for services rendered has none of the corruptive effect of a dole; the service provides an outlet for the energies of the younger men of the tribe, and keeps in friendlier hands rifles which otherwise might be used against Government; and, most important of all, the money percolates down to the smallest sub-divisions of the tribe, and links not only so many Khassadars but so many families to the interests of Government. For the profits of Khassadari service are shared, and frequently a Khassadar will make payments from his pay to three or four other men. In this way the Khassadars exert a great stabilising influence on their tribe, an influence more than once demonstrated in recent years.

30. The Political Agent has given us the economic statistics of three tribes of the Mahsuds. They are such striking comment on this aspect of the problem that we reproduce them in full—

—	Population.	Cultivable land Kharabs	Sheep and goats.	Cattle.	Camels.
Haibat Khel (Bahlolzai)	1391 in 204 houses	550	1000	500	60
Wazirgai (Alizai)	1501 in 319 houses	780	700	360	103
Galeshai (Shaman Khel)	3934 in 612 houses	628	2925	1128	90

The Haibat Khel have 40 Khassadars, the Wazirgai 41, and the Galeshai 136. The withdrawal of Khassadari service in such circumstances would mean ruin.

31. It has not been suggested to us by any witness, civil or military, that any reduction can or should be made in the Khassadar force of Waziristan. The General Officer Commanding Waziristan District indeed, who is peculiarly well qualified to judge, was emphatic that no alteration should be made. The considerations advanced in the preceding paragraphs have convinced us that no reduction of strength or pay is possible in the near future, and we recommend none. What are the possibilities in the more distant future we do not think anyone can assess. The provision of more employment outside the country might weaken the force of the economic argument, but until Government extends its administration, accepts full responsibility for the Indo-Afghan frontier, and disarms the tribes, it does not appear likely that the internal security of the country can be maintained without a force of approximately the nature and strength of the present Khassadars.

32. Mr. Staig is unable to attach to the economic factor the importance attributed to it by his colleagues. The other side of the picture is described in paragraph 13 of the Howell Committee's report. Bearing in mind the poverty that exists in certain sections of the population elsewhere in India, he doubts if payments in tribal territory in excess of the value of services rendered or facilities given can be justified by what is described as the necessity for filling the economic gap. The admission of such necessity would, moreover, logically involve Government in increasing liabilities as the standard of living rose. He considers that such payments are more correctly to be regarded as the purchase price of peace and goodwill from a population hostile and potentially a source of grave trouble. In view of the fact that (a) Levies in Baluchistan discharging duties similar to or—*vide* paragraph 29 of the Howell Committee's report—possibly more valuable than those of the Waziristan Khassadars, and (b) Khassadars in Mohmand country, are paid only Rs. 20 per mensem; and (c) those recently recruited in the Agra area of the Malakand agency are paid Rs. 12 per mensem, he feels that the pay of Rs. 25 per mensem is generous. From the evidence given to us however he is impressed by the consideration that were any reduction of the total sums disbursed to be enforced at present, it would cause a grave set back to Government's policy of peaceful penetration in Waziristan. On the understanding that measures to deal with defaults in Khassadari service include pecuniary penalties in the shape of fines or the withholding of allowances, and that such measures are resolutely adopted, he agrees with his colleagues that the numbers and rates of pay of Waziristan Khassadars should not at present be disturbed.

33. We see no advantage in retaining the temporary sanction for the Khassadars employed on the Wana-Ladha and Tanai-Gul Kach roads in South Waziristan, of the permanence of which there is now no question, and we recommend that it should be made permanent. The necessity for the retention of the Reserve Khassadars should, we think, be re-examined in 1939 when the present temporary sanction expires.



34. *Shia Salient Levies*.—Strength 126: annual cost Rs. 25,270.

*Sipaya Levies* (Included in District Levies).

The Shia Salient Levies were raised in 1928 from the Shia Orakzai tribes to help them to resist the attack of the Sunni Afridi and Orakzai. This attack was only partly the result of religious feeling: a more compelling cause was the fear that the Shia tribes would open the back door of the Tirah by allowing the construction of a road through their country to the Mastura. The maintenance of the completed portion of this road is still a matter of great importance to Government. The situation is at present quiet, but may alter at any moment, if the question of a Tirah road again comes to the front. Since 1931 a reduction of strength of 183 men has been made. The basic pay of a Levyman is Rs. 15.

35. The Shia Salient Levies are distributed in 11 posts along the line of the road and in the Lower Mastura Valley (tribal territory), where also the Sipaya Levies occupy one post. The latter, though included in the District Levies, more properly form part of those of the Shia Salient, performing, as they do, similar duties and being enlisted from the same tribes. The Levies are employed on the protection of the Marai-Suleiman Khel road and of the Shia Salient generally. They also collect information, and perform the every-day duties of political administration. From the political aspect they represent the only support, beyond small allowances, that Government now gives to their tribes. We recommend no reduction in strength or pay. The sanction for their employment is temporary. It does not appear to us likely that in view of Government's commitments any reduction of the present force will be possible and we accordingly recommend that the sanction for the Shia Salient Levies, including the Sipaya Levies, should be made permanent.

36. *Kohat District Levies*.—Strength 47: annual cost Rs. 10,130.

The Sipaya Levies have been mentioned above. The remainder are distributed in three groups covering the Samana range at Shinawari, Darband and on Samana itself. Their duties include pass responsibility, collection of information, maintenance of security along the border, and liaison with regular troops and Frontier Constabulary. Their numbers have been reduced since 1931 by 158 men. The basic rate of pay is Rs. 15.

37. The Deputy Commissioner is of opinion that the Samana group will be permanently required, and we agree with him. He thinks that the duties performed by the other two groups, each of 7 men, costing Rs. 3,240 per annum in the total, are of less importance but would retain them during the lifetime of the two Levy officers who command them, in view of the exceptionally meritorious services that they have rendered. We recommend that this should be done.

38. *Kohat Pass Khassadars*.—Strength 74: Annual cost Rs. 18,900.

These Khassadars were enlisted from the Adam Khel as part of the settlement which was concluded with that tribe after the Ellis and Foulkes murders. Their main duty is to ensure the safety of the Kohat-Peshawar trunk road, where it passes through tribal territory. They are also used for general political administration, to collect information, and to exert some check on the arms and drug traffic. A reduction of strength of 10 men has been made since 1931, which with certain other savings has resulted in decreased expenditure of Rs. 2,724 per annum. The basic pay is Rs. 20.

39. The nearest post to Kohat within administered territory is garrisoned by 9 men enlisted from the village of Jangal Khel, a suburb of Kohat. The Deputy Commissioner does not think that they are any longer required, and we recommend their discharge. This will result in a saving of Rs. 1,896 per annum. We do not recommend any reduction in the strength or pay of the remainder.

40. *Thakal and Burj Ladaur Levies*.—Strength 25: annual cost Rs. 4,860.

These Levies are enlisted from the Khalil tribe, and are the remnant of the levy force which was previously maintained in the Peshawar District. The Burj Ladaur group is stationed near Matanni on the Peshawar-Kohat road, and the Tahkal group is attached to the Khan of the tribe, more to maintain his prestige than anything else. From enquiries we have made we think that there is little justification for the further employment of either group and we recommend their total disbandment.

41. *Hassan Khel and Ashu Khel Khassadars*.—Strength 18: annual cost Rs. 4,500.

The Hassan Khel and Ashu Khel are sections of the Adam Khel, other sections of whom provide the Khassadars of the Kohat Pass. They live in the hills of tribal territory south of Peshawar District and east of the Kohat pass. The force is divided into three groups, two from the Hassan Khel and one from the Ashu Khel, commanding the main paths across the border. These tribes have always given the Peshawar District authorities trouble, and are accustomed to harbour outlaws. Through these Khassadars Government is able to exert some control over outlaws and increase the security of the border. The basic pay is Rs. 20. We think that the retention of this small force at its present cost is justified.

42. *Mohmand Khassadars*.—Strength 422: annual cost Rs. 1,09,200. 192 men, costing Rs. 49,200, are only temporarily sanctioned.

The permanent portion of the force was originally enlisted in 1920 to man the Blockade Line, which stretched from Michni on the Kabul River to Abazai on the Swat. The temporary portion was raised during the troubles of 1930, and at one time had a strength of nearly 300 men. The basic pay is now Rs. 20. A reduction of Rs. 940 per annum in contingent expenditure has recently been made.

43. These are true Khassadars of the Waziristan type and the arguments for the retention of Khassadars in that area apply equally to this. Their duties include the protection of the Gandab road and the border from Michni to Abazai, and the carrying out of ordinary political administration. Their employment creates a party in the tribe favourable to Government's interests, and strengthens the authority of the maliks. The pay that they receive is an appreciable addition to the income of a tribe that is poor and receives only small allowances.

44. We cannot visualise so radical a change of policy in this area as would involve the abandonment of the Gandab road, and so long as it is retained some protective force is required. For this Khassadars provide the cheapest, and probably the most effective, form of protection. The strength of the force does not seem to us excessive for the performance of its present duties, and indeed it seems probable that with the development of Government's policy more and not less men will be required. We therefore recommend that the existing strength should be retained on a permanent basis.

45. The question of a command allowance of Rs. 100 per mensem to the Assistant Political Officer Mohmands has been brought to our notice. The present practice is to grant such allowance, in addition to the pay even of posts the duties of which relate mainly to the Khassadari organisation. We have alluded to this in paragraph 55. Here we merely observe that there appears to us stronger justification for the grant of the allowance in the particular case of the post of Assistant Political Officer Mohmands than in some others which have come to our notice, and so long as the practice continues, we feel that it should be given in this instance. Certain small items of expenditure—the pay of a supervisor, the allowance to a clerk and the allowances for the deposit of rifles—are open to criticism. It is very important in our opinion that Khassadar allotments should be spent on the tribesmen and not frittered away in allowances to outsiders.



46. *Khyber Khassadars*.—Strength 1617 : annual cost Rs. 5,03,800.

418 Khassadars are at the disposal of the North Western Railway which makes a contribution of Rs. 70,300 for them. The Khassadars however are administered as one force, and where, as is usual, the road and the railway run close together picquets protect both. The basic rate of pay is Rs. 25. As elsewhere, the reduction of rate in 1932 allowed for an increase in strength to be made. Enlistment is made from Afridis (1304), Shinwaris (119), Shilmanis (86) and Mullagoris (92), and their duties vary. The Shilmanis and Mullagoris hold posts in their country and carry out the everyday political administration. The latter have also the special responsibility of protecting the Mullagori road which provides a second approach to Landi Kotal from the Peshawar District. The Shinwaris, in whose country Landi Kotal and other important military posts lie, provide protection for the main road and railway within their limits, hold certain military picquets, are the instruments of political administration, and are constantly employed in liaison with regular troops. In the case of all these three tribes there is a definite Government administration from within, as in Waziristan, and the employment of their Khassadars can be justified in differing degrees, by all the arguments that have been adduced for that area. The economic argument applies with particular force to the Mullagoris and Shilmanis. The Shinwaris, though better off, have been dispossessed of much of their best land, perform heavy duties, and suffer the greatest interference with their tribal life.

47. The Afridis are on a different footing. They afford protection to the road and railway from the border of the administered district to within a few miles of Landi Kotal, and to some extent to the roads on the Kajuri plains. They also perform the ordinary duties of political administration within the Khyber area are generally responsible for the safety of the border have liaison duties with the regular troops, and are used as a means of communication with Tirah. But the Khyber is only the fringe of Afridi country and, with the exception of the Kuki Khel villages of the lower and the Zakha Khel villages of the upper valley, contains little of the inhabited area. The administration of the Afridis is still from without, and the Khassadars have not been used for extension of Government control, nor, usually, has it been found expedient to enforce their tribal responsibility.

48. In the case of the Shinwaris, Mullagoris and Shilmanis we are satisfied that the employment of the present number of Khassadars is justified by the duties that they perform and we recommend no alteration. An examination however of the distribution of the Afridi Khassadars leads us to think that, viewed purely from this aspect, their strength is excessive. As an instance we may mention that, though a very large number of men are strung out along the road, a larger number perhaps than are actually needed for its protection, there are nearly 400 men in the lines at Jamrud. But as we have seen elsewhere the actual duties performed do not provide the whole justification for the employment of Khassadars. The Afridis are a large and important, but poor tribe, whose income has been much reduced in late years by the contraction of Government employment. Its future relations with Government are now a matter of discussion, and if a new basis of agreement is found, it is probable that the Khassadars will be completely reorganised, their numbers increased and their pay reduced. We do not therefore think that this is a suitable opportunity to make any alterations in the present arrangements. What may be possible in the more distant future must depend on our new relations with the tribe. In regard to the Afridi Khassadars, Mr. Staig considers that Government are at present securing a very inadequate return for the sums they disburse. He differs from us in the weight to be attached to the economic factor and points to the substantial figure of Rs. 2·8 lakhs per annum accruing to the

Afridis as *maliki*. They have been further fortunate in the large sums that found their way into Afridi pockets during the construction of the Khyber railway. As already indicated the number of Khassadars employed is excessive. Apart from those in the lines at Jamrud, it is understood that of the 59 posts held, 22 are purely military picquets, only seven of which would be retained by the military authorities, were Khassadars not available. *Prima facie*, therefore, there is a strong case for a review of the strength, with reference to the duties required. The pay of Rs. 25 per mensem, liberal where the full duties of a Waziristan Khassadar are discharged, becomes excessive for the lighter services rendered by the Afridi. His neighbour the Mohmand Khassadar receives Rs. 20. In regard to the reorganisation of the Afridi Khassadars, the only evidence we received was that of the Political Agent, Khyber. He stated that in the event of the Tirah Road being built, it was proposed gradually to change the Khyber Khassadar force into a force of levies, gradually reducing the pay from Rs. 25 to Rs. 15 or Rs. 20 per mensem, but increasing the strength so as to cover the added length of the road. Unfortunately the prospect of the construction of the road seems at present a distant one. If this estimate is correct, the contemplated reorganisation will be long delayed and the probability is that Government's disbursements on the present scale will continue indefinitely with little or no progress in their policy of peaceful penetration. There may be considerations of higher policy which preclude any action by Government in this regard at present, but Mr. Staig's feeling is that the situation should be carefully watched and that unless in the near future, Afridi opposition to Government's policy of peaceful penetration is withdrawn, a favourable opportunity should be taken to curtail Khassadari expenditure by reducing the pay and numbers of the Afridi Khassadars. We may state that in our opinion it would be quite feasible to vary the conditions of service in this area without affecting those in Waziristan, and *vice versa*. Except in the records of Government, there is little connection between them.

49. *Malakand Levies and Police*.—Strength 357: Annual Cost Rs. 90,166.

Of this cost Rs. 14,563 are paid by the Irrigation Department for special services in connection with the Upper Swat Canal. The force has recently been reorganised. It constitutes the sole means of administration in the large semi-administered tracts of Lower Swat and Sam Ranizai, in which administration has increased with the construction of the canal, and the enforcement of greater control in such matters as outlaws, and contraband. The strength in 1931 was 372 and the cost Rs. 85,974. The increase in cost is due to the sanction of a clothing allowance and discharge gratuities for the men. The basic rate of pay is Rs. 12. We do not think that the establishment is in excess of requirements, and we recommend that no alterations should be made.

50. *Agra Khassadars*.—Strength 20: Annual cost Rs. 2,880.

These are a small body of locally enlisted men who work in liaison with the Frontier Constabulary detachment in Agra, and provide the main source of information for Bajaur and Utman Khel country, which otherwise is difficult to obtain. It is desirable by the grant of this small service to attach the local people to Government's interest. A proposal, which might result in the ultimate absorption of these Khassadars, is before the North West Frontier Province Government for an addition to the strength of the Malakand Levies, to take over the duties of the present Frontier Constabulary detachment in Agra, in the event of its withdrawal. We think that this may eventually be the solution, but we are extremely doubtful if the time has yet come to withdraw the Frontier Constabulary detachment. The situation is not really stable, and the Frontier Constabulary detachment is not only far stronger but also a more marked indication of

Government's intention of holding Agra than any force of Levies could be. We think that in present circumstances these Khassadars should be retained.

51. *Dir Levies.*—Strength 275 : Annual cost Rs. 68,302.

These Levies, which are of long standing, are responsible for the protection of the Chitral road from Chakdarra to the Lowarai Pass; and are quartered in the staging posts along it. They also perform political duties for the Assistant Political Officer Dir, whose headquarters are at Chakdarra. Since 1931 the strength has been reduced by 115 men, three posts have been given up, and a saving of Rs. 13,068 per annum effected. The basic rate of pay is Rs. 12.

52. The everyday protection of the road, and the guarding of staging posts remain necessary even with the improvement of the road up to Dir, and if this force was reduced, new arrangements would have to be negotiated with the Nawab of Dir, not without cost to Government. We therefore recommend that no alterations in the present arrangements should be made.

53. In addition to the cost of the forces that are maintained for the protection of the Chitral Road, there is charged to this head of account a sum of Rs. 20,000 per annum, paid as allowances to the tribes through whose territory it runs. We do not think that any alteration of this arrangement is possible.

54. *Chitral Levies.*—Strength 100 : Annual cost Rs. 23,300.

These Levies take on the task of close protection of the Chitral Road from the Lowarai Pass where it enters Chitral State to Mirkhani in the main Chitral valley. The country is sparsely inhabited and close to the Afghan border. Raids have been frequent in the past. They also occupy four small posts in the lower Chitral valley below Mirkhani, which serve to control the international boundary and collect information. A few are stationed in Chitral itself where they provide guards on the treasury and other Government buildings. The Levies are fully employed and cheap. Any reduction would mean the assumption of some of their duties by another and probably more expensive agency. We recommend no reduction.

55. *Command Allowances.*—The Khassadar command allowances appear to us to require adjustment, and in certain cases, such as those of the Political Agents Khyber and North and South Waziristan, reduction. The question has however lately been under the consideration of the Government of India, and we make no recommendations.

56. *The Value of the Khassadar System.*—We now come to the general question of the value of the Khassadar system to Government. It is most highly developed in Waziristan, and in our discussion of the establishments there we have stated in some detail the arguments that have led us to believe that it is not a bad thing in itself, a thing to be abolished if possible, but a very valuable method of administering tribal areas and extending Government's control. Such results as it has already achieved could not in our opinion be obtained by any other method, or at such little cost. The chief criticism to which it is subjected, is that the Khassadars are unreliable and would be dangerous in war. That is so, but experience tends to show that as the tribes come more and more under control, the reliability of their Khassadars increases. For the Khassadar is ultimately the servant of the tribe and not of Government. He is the representative of his tribe to carry out its obligations, not the servant of Government to coerce his tribe. If a tribe is at variance with Government, so must also its Khassadars be. The remedy lies in so attaching the tribe to Government that the causes of variance are few. It would be fatal to the whole system if we were to treat the Khassadars as mere mercenaries and expect them to fight their own people. This the Khassadar will not and should not do, but he is prepared to coerce even his

own relations if they are acting against the will of his tribe. Nor should we expect the Khassadar to fire to kill and to incur mortal enmity for the sake of the few rupees we give him. The progress that has been made in the last 15 years has been startling; and we may expect it to continue, if at a slower rate. The rate depends on larger issues, on our relations with Afghanistan and the effort we are prepared to make to extend our control up to the Afghan boundary.

57. *Colonisation*.—The possibility of colonising tribesmen of the North West Frontier Province tribal area within India, as a means of improving their economic condition, and so effecting a saving to Government in the cost of more direct contributions has been constantly considered. The main obstacle is the condition of residence on the land, which is required in all colonies. Pathans are devoted to their homes and, as hillmen, intolerant of heat. They will not therefore accept land on this condition. And even if they did, the colonists would tend to separate from their tribe, their place would soon be filled by an adaptable birthrate, and the whole object of colonisation would be lost. This is the dilemma that has so far prevented progress. A better line of approach would seem to be to facilitate the acquisition by tribesmen of land inside the administered districts as near as possible to their tribal area, without insisting on any condition of permanent residence. In this way an addition is made to the resources of tribesmen still living in their tribal area, and at the same time the property acquired serves in some sort as a hostage in Government's hands for the good behaviour of the tribe. A small beginning on these lines has been made with Mahsuds in Tank tahsil. We recommend that the existing facilities should be extended, but do not think that in present conditions it is possible or desirable that this should be done at the cost of the Khassadari service.

58. *Contracts*.—*Waziristan*—The procedure for the placing of all contracts in the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province laid down in Memorandum 24465-75-P-1338-P. S., dated 8th December 1934, from the Chief Secretary to Government, North-West Frontier Province, has been applied in Waziristan for two years. We have received evidence that it has resulted in a substantial reduction of rates, and that on the whole it has been worked without friction. The inherent difficulty in fixing a reasonable rate has been largely overcome by the opportunity for discussion afforded by the Advisory Committee and by compromise. No sound method of improving the present procedure has been suggested to us, and we recommend that it should be continued. Two subsidiary points await decision, the scale of royalty, and whether it should be paid on the works in Wana which are being carried out by troop labour. We are inclined to think that the scale proposed by the North-West Frontier Province Government in Chief Secretary's Memorandum 2095-P., dated 2nd July 1935, will work more equitably and economically than that proposed by the Government of India themselves and recommend its adoption. For the reasons given in Chief Secretary to Government, North-West Frontier Province's Memorandum 7323-P., dated 7th March 1935, we think that royalty should be paid on the Wana works. The Political Agent, South Waziristan, has informed us that much real damage has been done to the Kach land in the Wana Toi by the removal of stones and gravel. The cases in which such royalty will be payable are likely to be few and are to be treated on their merits: we see no advantage therefore in attempting too meticulous a classification of the items in a project which should be considered in the calculation of the percentage payable. The figure proposed by the North-West Frontier Province Government is, as far as we can judge, suitable.

59. *Khyber*.—Supply contracts in this area are given by open tender. For works the general procedure is in force. The question has not assumed such proportions as in Waziristan, and the sanctioning authorities in consultation with the Commander Royal Engineers, Peshawar District, have

experienced no difficulty in coming to agreed conclusions. We therefore recommend the continuance of the procedure. On the evidence given to us we think that the labour rates which vary by areas, are susceptible of reduction.

60. *Malakand*.—Contracts in the Malakand Agency must be considered separately for the protected area and the States. In the latter, we may say at once, it would be quite impossible to apply the general procedure. For in them it is not a matter of Government giving an order but of negotiation with their rulers.

61. (a) *Protected Area*.—I. Supply Contracts are given by open tender, subject to approval of the tenderers by the political and military authorities. This small restriction is needed to prevent undesirable persons from coming into the Agency and to give some preference to local contractors. The rates obtained are in many cases less than those in force in the Peshawar district.

II. Works are carried out either by directly employed labour or by contract placed by tender within a list approved by the Political Agent and Commander Royal Engineers. Other factors being equal, preference is given to local contractors, but for special works outsiders are also allowed to compete. From the figures which have been given to us it appears that the rates of daily labour are, if anything, less than those payable in the Peshawar district, and that tender rates are practically the same. The system of restricted tender in force in this area is more favourable to Government than the general procedure and appears to us to be working satisfactorily. We recommend that it should remain unaltered.

62. (b) *States*.—I. *Supply*.—In the Dir and Swat States no supplies are normally required. It is only at the time of the biennial Reliefs that a few local supplies such as wood, bhusa and meat are required in Dir State. The total value of the purchases in 1936 was only Rs. 732 and the rates compared favourably with those of the Peshawar district. Contractors are nominated by the Political Agent on the advice of the Nawab of Dir and rates are fixed by the political and military authorities in consultation. We do not recommend any change in the existing arrangement. It is in the Chitral States that difficulties arise. Local supplies comprising firewood, potatoes, onions, bhusa, grain, and meat are required for the military garrisons at Drosh and Chitral. But to quote the Political Agent, "the Chitral State receives its revenues in kind. After paying his revenue, the Chitrali has little or nothing left beyond his own household needs. It is therefore impossible for anyone except the State to supply the troops in Chitral with local produce, unless a middleman were to buy from the State and sell to the Army, or a contractor were to import from India. In 1928, an agreement was made by Government with the Mehtar of Chitral regarding the supply of the troops in the country. Under this agreement, the Mehtar undertook to supply up to certain quantities of various articles at rates not exceeding agreed maxima. At that time, (owing to there being no motor road to Dir) the carriage rates on goods to Chitral were very high. By the agreement, Government made an estimated saving of Rs. 55,000 per annum on the cost of supplying the Chitral garrison and in return for this loss of income to the Mehtar, he was given an increase of Rs. 30,000 (thirty thousand) to his annual subsidy. Since 1928 a motor road has been made to Dir and the carriage rates have dropped from Rs. 9-10-0 to Rs. 3-4-0 per maund from Dargai to Drosh. Indian prices of wheat and barley have also dropped considerably. It therefore follows that the agreement made in 1928, at that time so favourable to Government, is not now so valuable. There is one saving feature however about the agreement. It is, that the rates quoted are maxima and that rates are to be fixed to the satisfaction of the Political Agent. The invidious task of reconciling the divergent views of the Peshawar District Headquarters and the Mehtar of Chitral with regard

to rates falls therefore each year to the Political Agent. It is not clear that in 1928 the fact that the rates quoted in the agreement were *maxima* was thoroughly explained to the Mehtar, and since then, considerable trouble has been experienced when trying to get rates reduced. The rates for barley and wheat have, however, come down by Rs. 2-10-0 and Rs. 5-5-0 per maund respectively since 1928 with a consequent saving to Government (and loss to the Mehtar) of approximately Rs. 42,412 per annum." The military authorities believe that they could now make a considerable saving by importing supplies from India, and Government is not debarred by anything in its agreement with the Mehtar from doing so. But there are obvious political advantages in obtaining supplies direct from him, and there is a definite military advantage in being certain of supplies irrespectively of the safety of the line of communication. It should be remembered also, that any further large reduction in the Mehtar's receipts from this source would probably compel Government to give him financial support in some other way.

63. We have no means of testing the accuracy of the estimates which have been made by the military authorities, but it appears to us unlikely that firewood and bhusa could be profitably imported. The present procedure appears to us unsatisfactory in many respects, particularly in the responsibility it places on the Political Agent of fixing rates, but we are doubtful if the cancellation of the existing agreement would result in any general advantage to Government. We therefore recommend that for the present no alteration should be made in the procedure, but that gradual pressure should be brought to bear on the Mehtar to reduce the rates that are too high. The amount of money involved is comparatively small, as the troops stationed in Drosh and Chitral consist of one battalion only with a few artillery and engineers.

II. Works are either carried out by directly employed labour or under contracts given by restricted tender or rarely, by nomination, in which case the rate is fixed by the Political Agent and Commander Royal Engineers in consultation. Care is taken that tenderers are acceptable to the ruler of the State concerned. Labour is cheap and economical rates of tender are being obtained. We recommend that no alteration should be made in the existing procedure.

64. *Kurram, Kohat Tribal area and Peshawar Tribal Area.*—The practice in these areas is set out in Chief Secretary to Government, North-West Frontier Province's letter P. N.-3029-Pc N./1338-P. S., dated 14th September 1934. Procedure varies greatly and we think it would be difficult to standardize it without disturbance disproportionate to any advantage obtained. We think that the practice of nomination of Mohmand contractors for works inside the administered district and payment of royalty thereon should cease. Otherwise we recommend that the existing practice in each area should be continued.

65. *Royalty.*—We agree with the North-West Frontier Province Government that the practice in Mohmand tribal territory should follow that of the Khyber, and that in all other areas, with the exception noted above, the existing practice should continue.

66. *Political Staff.*—The posts by areas are as follows :—

Waziristan : Resident.

Political Agent, North Waziristan.

Assistant Political Agent, North Waziristan (temporary).

Assistant Political Officer, North Waziristan.

Political Agent, South Waziristan.

Assistant Political Agent, South Waziristan (temporary).

Assistant Political Officer, South Waziristan.



Khyber: Political Agent.

Assistant Political Officer.

Kurram: Political Agent.

Assistant Political Officer.

Malakand: Political Agent.

Assistant Political Agent, Chitral.

Assistant Political Officer

Dera Ismail Khan:

Extra Assistant Commissioner,  
Sheranis.

Peshawar:

Assistant Political Officer,  
Mohmands.

We have examined the necessity for each of the posts. The Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sheranis, is no longer concerned with political work in tribal areas, but with the ordinary district administration. The cost of his post, if required, should be transferred to the Provincial budget. The remainder we consider are needed. The Political Agents in Waziristan are unable, we think, to deal unaided with the work involved in the control of their Khassadar forces, the volume of which will be increased as a result of the regularisation of accounts that is now being brought in. We therefore recommend that the two posts of Assistant Political Agent in North and South Waziristan should be made permanent.

67. *Protection of the Tanaiafort-Sandeman Road.*—We have seen the correspondence on the subject and heard the views of local officers. We recommend that in Baluchistan the existing system of road protection should be continued. We think that the protection of the Gul Kach bridge can safely be entrusted to Khassadars in normal times: it is no more vulnerable than many bridges in Waziristan, for which no special protection is provided. We consider that the additional strength of Khassadars proposed by the North-West Frontier Province Government is required for the combined protection of the bridge and the road from it to Toi Khula, which passes through 13 miles of as dangerous and deserted country as can be found in Waziristan. The scale of protection proposed is only two Khassadars a mile. We accordingly recommend that sanction should be given for a force of 42 men with the usual contingent allotment, as proposed by the North-West Frontier Province Government in their Express letter No. 3991-PC/1053-PS, dated 26th October 1936, and, since with the construction of the Gul Kach bridge there is no longer any question of the maintenance of this road being temporary, that the sanction should be permanent.

68. *Construction of a Civil Serai at Ladha to contain also a Hospital and School.*—From 1920 to 1922 the headquarters of the Waziristan Force were in Ladha. The available area there was however considered inadequate for the permanent headquarters of the large regular force that it was then decided to leave in Waziristan, and this and other considerations caused the transfer of headquarters to Razmak. Razmak however is in Wazir limits, and as the object of our policy was to overawe the Mahsuds, the change of location from Ladha, the main population centre of upper Mahsud country, to Razmak, outside Mahsud country altogether, had obvious political disadvantages. These were increased by the fact that, Razmak being on the disputed boundary between the two tribes, we were inevitably involved in that dispute.

69. During the construction of the direct road from Razmak to Wana, Scouts forces were placed at each end, at Ladha and Tiarza, and it became gradually to be realised that for the protection of the road their permanent location there would be necessary. This being so, the opportunity occurred of making Ladha, under Scouts protection, the headquarters also of the political administration of Northern Mahsud country, and of removing the disadvantages which its location in Razmak entailed. The passage of

Mahsuds through a small portion of Wazir territory on their way to the political authorities in Razmak has been a constant source of friction and has delayed the acceptance of the boundary, as laid down by Government.

70. Inside Razmak camp there is a hospital, built primarily for the tribesmen, but its situation prevents its free use by them, and it mainly serves the cooly population which is always present in Razmak, and the unentitled followers of the military camp. At Jandola also there is a small hospital, but Jandola being in the country of the Bhattanis, hereditary enemies of the Mahsuds, it cannot be used by the latter. A school has been established first in Maidan, and later at Ladha, in temporary huts. It is much appreciated by the Mahsuds, but is handicapped by inadequate accommodation and equipment.

71. It was accordingly proposed, as one scheme, that a Scouts post (to include political administrative buildings), and a Serai to contain a hospital, a school and accommodation for visiting tribesmen and a Khas-sadar guard, should be built at Ladha. It was not intended to give up entirely the Mahsud tahsil in Razmak, as the maintenance of some staff there is necessary for liaison with the military authorities: the tahsildar himself would divide his time between Ladha and Razmak. The necessity of some safe accommodation for tribesmen visiting Government officials was explained. In the near vicinity there are a number of small hamlets, each the property of a family or small group but there are no *serais* in which visitors can stay for the night. Mahsuds are accustomed to stay with each other when they travel, but it can readily be seen that the large numbers whose business with Government will take them to Ladha would impose an intolerable burden on the hospitality of the surrounding hamlets, with the result that accommodation would be refused. Even a privately owned *Serai* could not take the place of Government accommodation, as except under Government protection no Mahsud would be safe from his enemies. For some reason, which we have been unable to discover, the proposal for the *Serai* and the buildings included in it became separated from that for the Scouts post, and has only recently been revived. Meanwhile sanction has been given for the construction of the Scouts post, and work is in slow progress.

72. Hospitals and Schools will be admitted to be perhaps the two chief means of spreading civilization in tribal areas, which is the policy of Government, and we do not think that the provision of a hospital and school in Mahsud country requires any further justification. We think that the scheme will prove advantageous both to Government and the Mahsuds, and recommend that it should be sanctioned. We have not examined the details of cost of the hospital with equipment, for which alone estimates seem to have been prepared, is likely to cost about Rs. 70,000 but we may point out that in Ladha owing to our previous occupation of the site no compensation for land will have to be paid and that any surplus tahsil buildings in Razmak can be utilised for the accommodation of the office and staff of the Resident in Waziristan, which is at present inconveniently housed in hospital and treasury buildings. In this connection Mr. Staig would refer to paragraph 24 of the Howell Committee's report regarding the devotion to charitable purposes of some portion of the tribal income and feels that before administrative approval is accorded to this scheme an effort should be made to secure from the beneficiaries a contribution towards the running costs of the hospital, estimated to amount to Rs. 12,700 per annum.

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## PART III.

## BALUCHISTAN.

73. *General*.—Our terms of reference are not strictly applicable to Baluchistan. The recommendations of the Howell Committee, which are contained in paragraphs 63 to 68 of its report, were few and indefinite; the Committee did not visit Baluchistan; and on these recommendations the Government of India passed no orders. Our examination of Watch and Ward expenditure has therefore been mainly directed to the justification and adequacy of present establishments and their cost.

74. The local Administration has recently brought all its establishments under review, and proposals for reorganisation, involving economies of Rs. 3 lakhs a year, are now before the Government of India. Though few direct economies have been proposed in the establishments which we are considering, the redistribution of duties as between Levies and Police has made a very substantial reduction in the latter possible.

75. *Zhob Militia*.—Zhob Militia: Present strength 1362: annual cost Rs. 8,45,800.

The Zhob Agency has an area of over ten thousand square miles, but is only very sparsely inhabited, particularly in the area known as Kakar Khorasan, abutting on the Afghan frontier, which for close on 200 miles forms the northern and western boundary of the Agency. Afghan tribesmen, from whom trouble is most to be expected, are martial and well armed. For these reasons it has been found necessary to maintain a more regular force to supplement the Levies, who, as in other areas, form the chief instrument of Government administration. The Zhob Militia is the most highly organised of the Irregular Corps in Baluchistan and is of the same nature as the Scouts Corps of Waziristan. Its rôle is to protect the Zhob Agency from incursions across the Afghan frontier, to control the large nomad Afghan population that enters it in the winter, and generally to maintain internal order.

76. Proposals for the reorganisation of this Corps have recently been submitted to the Government of India. They involve (a) a reorganisation of the existing Corps which is estimated to effect a saving of over Rs. half a lakh a year and (b) an addition to its present strength of about 100 men, the financial effect of which is to reduce the saving to Rs. 23 thousand. We have been unable to examine these proposals in detail, but are satisfied that the scheme as a whole is economically framed. We consider that the additional strength will add greatly to the efficiency of the Corps, and recommend that the proposals should be adopted. Mr. Staig is inclined to think that the cost of the clerical establishment proposed, which includes an office Superintendent on Rs. 250—350 per mensem and 4 Senior Assistants rising to Rs. 175 per mensem, is susceptible of reduction.

77. We had the opportunity of inspecting the buildings in Headquarters at Fort Sandeman, and found them inadequate for the strength which they are required to accommodate. Men were living in tents and godowns. We were informed that posts were similarly overcrowded. From figures supplied us by the Garrison Engineer it appears that, in Headquarters and posts combined, accommodation only exists for 826 out of a total strength of 1357, and an average present strength of 1057. We also found much of the accommodation of inferior quality. Further expenditure on buildings is, we think, inevitable, and we recommend that adequate accommodation should be provided at once for the average present strength, and that, as funds are available, the quality of the existing accommodation should be improved to the standard sanctioned for irregular troops elsewhere.

78. *Mekran Levy Corps*.—Mekran Levy Corps: Present strength 454: annual cost Rs. 2,94,800.

This Corps is maintained by Government in Mekran (Kalat State) to carry out its international responsibilities along the Iranian frontier. The Corps is responsible for 300 miles of frontier from the sea northwards, and is quartered in six outposts with headquarters at Panjgur, which is itself some 250 miles by road from Kalat. Distances are great and roads bad; post and telegraph communications are maintained *via* Karachi and the Persian Gulf, and are liable both to delay and interruption.

79. We do not think that the strength of the Corps is excessive for the duties which it has to perform, and we recommend no reduction. The rates of pay are reasonable. We are however inclined to think that some of the local allowances may now be too high: this point and other possible savings are being examined by the Agent to the Governor-General, who expects to be able to effect some economy.

80. We are impressed by the need for better communications, and we recommend that the installation of wireless sets of a manual type which have proved successful in the Zhob Militia should be considered.

81. *Chagai Levy Corps*.—Chagai Levy Corps: Strength 358: annual cost Rs. 1,54,700.

The Corps is responsible for the 600 miles of international frontier on the western and northern limits of the Chagai Agency, and for the maintenance of order within the Agency particularly in its western portion, where there are no Levies. It was raised in 1924-25 to take over these duties on the withdrawal of regular troops. It consists of a temporary nucleus of 191 men, to which a permanent addition of 167 was made in 1926. Proposals have been before the Government of India for some time to add 71 men to the effective strength at a cost of Rs. 47,000 and to make the whole sanction permanent.

82. Posts along the Iranian frontier are at present held by such small garrisons as four to eight men. It is impossible for British tribesmen to maintain themselves in such small numbers so close to the frontier, and the expedient has been taken of garrisoning these posts with Iranian tribesmen, whose influence acts as some check on the activities of their kinsmen in Iran. This position is however obviously unsatisfactory. We have received evidence that administration in the Chagai Agency is steadily extending. There is a considerable volume of trade across the Iranian frontier, Customs posts are being established, and passport control is being tightened up.

83. We think that the proposed increase in the Corps is justified by its increased duties, and by the necessity of strengthening its western garrisons. The rates of pay are not excessive. We can see no likelihood of the responsibilities of the Corps decreasing. We therefore recommend that sanction should be given to the increase proposed, and that sanction for the whole Corps should be permanent. As in the case of the Mekran Levy Corps, the Agent to the Governor-General expects that a detailed examination of contingent expenditure, which he is undertaking, will effect some economy.

84. *Levies*.—Levies: Annual cost Rs. 12,00,700.

The Levies constitute the chief administrative machinery of Baluchistan. It is only in the urban areas that there are police: in the rest of the province every Government activity is carried out through the agency of the Levies, whose functions include the prevention and investigation of crime, the maintenance of public security, and the judicial and revenue administration. They serve not only in their individual capacity but also as the representatives of their tribes in the carrying out of their obligations to Government. In this respect they are similar to the Khassadars of the North-West Frontier Province. Their essentially civil character is illustrated by the fact that the majority of them are unarmed.

85. They formed part of the original arrangements under which Sir Robert Sandeman established relations with the tribes, and have developed

in different areas on somewhat different lines. A reorganisation has now been carried out, to take effect from the beginning of the next financial year. Under it there is no reduction or increase in the total expenditure, but many duties have been taken over from the police, a fact which has helped to make the substantial economies in that force, that are mentioned in paragraph 74, possible. It has also been found possible to make adjustments within the Levy strength to increase the security of the roads. The extra expenditure involved in this measure has been met mainly by a reduction of pay in the higher ranks. Rates of pay have been made uniform, strengths fixed, and generally safeguards introduced to prevent irregularities. Before reorganisation the basic rate of pay of a levyman varied by areas, although there were no valid reasons for variation. It has now been fixed throughout the province at Rs. 20 per mensem.

86. In the new system Levies have been classified under three heads—Agency Levies, Tribal service and Individual service. The Agency Levies, numbering some 2300, are those that are employed directly under Government on all kinds of administrative work, are present on their duty, and are paid individually every month by Government officers on regular acquittance rolls. Tribal service consists of those payments that are made to tribes and tribal leaders for specific services, which usually include the provision of so many Levies. They are made under contract, and Government is primarily responsible neither for the rates of pay nor for its proper distribution, though it takes steps to secure that personnel which is paid from its money is equitably treated. Individual service, previously misleadingly styled *khananishini*, consists of payments to tribal leaders for the many duties they perform in aid of Government's administration. These payments, though in origin of many different natures, now approximate to the Maliki allowances, which are paid in the North-West Frontier Province, and are real payments for services rendered and expenses incurred. The Baluchistan jirga members usually receive no specific remuneration either for their services or in the form of travelling allowance, and this individual service allowance is all that they receive. Provision has been made in the new orders for the examination of each allowance on the death of its holder, and the withdrawal of any that are not justified by tribal or family status.

87. We do not propose any alteration in the new orders, which appear to us likely to lead to greater efficiency, and have made economies possible in other establishments.

88. *Colonisation*.—The necessity of improving the economic condition of the tribes is not so urgent in Baluchistan as in the North-West Frontier Province. The population is still mainly nomad and pastoral, with whom agriculture is of secondary importance. Attempts are however being made to settle some of them on 40,000 acres of Government irrigated land in the Nasirabad tahsil: it is too early yet to judge of the experiment.

89. *Contracts*.—The system of contracts in Baluchistan is mainly of open tender. There is no royalty or commission of the kind payable in the North-West Frontier Province.

90. Contracts for buildings are given by open tender, invariably in the case of military ones, and usually in the case of civil. Only in unsettled areas is a civil contract given by nomination.

91. Contracts for the construction and maintenance of roads are naturally more often given by nomination. Road gangs could scarcely be appointed otherwise. Military interest in roads is confined to one third of the expenditure, with a maximum of three lakhs.

92. All works contracts given by nomination are subject to the approval of the contractor by the M. E. S. and the fixation by them of the rates.

93. Military supply contracts are given by open tender, except for firewood and *bhusa* in the Zhob Agency. Recently, on the suggestion of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command, new orders

have been issued for the regulation of these contracts. They provide for nomination by the Political Agent, fixation of rates by consultation, and a final decision by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.

94. The existing system, both in works and supply contracts, appears to us to be working economically and without friction. The civil authorities are willing in the case of the *bhusa* contract to substitute a system of true local purchase, but we imagine there would be difficulties in this. It was represented to us that the maintenance of some civil control over the firewood contract was needed to conserve the wood supplies in the neighbourhood of Fort Sandeman, and we think this contention valid. We recommend therefore that the existing system should continue, both for works and supplies. The procedure now in force in the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province was framed to meet a special problem, which does not exist in Baluchistan, and we see no advantage in attempting to extend it to that province.

95. *Political Staff*.—The whole of Baluchistan may be considered as a tribal area, but under the new proposals which are being submitted to Government only the following gazetted and superior non-gazetted officers will be concerned with tribal administration:—

Quetta: Political Agent.

Assistant Political Agent.

Extra Assistant Commissioner, Quetta.

Extra Assistant Commissioner, Pishin.

Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chaman.

Sibi: Political Agent.

Assistant Political Agent.

Assistant Political Agent, Colonization Nasirabad  
(temporary).

Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sibi.

Extra Assistant Commissioner, Marris & Bugtis.

Extra Assistant Commissioner, Nasirabad.

Loralai: Political Agent.

Assistant Political Agent.

Extra Assistant Commissioner, Bori.

Extra Assistant Commissioner, Duki.

Extra Assistant Commissioner, Barkhan.

Zhob: Political Agent.

Assistant Political Agent.

Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lower Zhob.

Extra Assistant Commissioner, Upper Zhob.

Kalat: Political Agent.

Assistant Political Agent, Mekran.

Assistant Political Agent, Chagai.

Extra Assistant Commissioner, Bolan.

96. The Extra Assistant Commissioners hold charge of sub-divisions and we agree with the Agent to the Governor-General that officers of this status are required for the efficient performance of such responsible duties. It may be noted that he has proposed a substantial reduction in the Extra Assistant Commissioner cadre as a whole, and is prepared to abolish the post of Extra Assistant Commissioner Nasirabad in a few years' time, when the progress of colonisation allows the Assistant Political Agent to devote more of his time to general administration. As for the Assistant

Political Agents, he thinks that those of Chagai, Mekran and Nasirabad are permanently, and those of Quetta and Zhob usually required, while in Sibi and Loralai there is not the same necessity for whole-time officers. In Kalat however where there is no sanctioned post of Assistant Political Agent, one is often required. He would therefore be prepared, if necessary, to accept the substitution of three non-localised posts for the existing four localised posts of Quetta, Zhob, Sibi and Loralai.

97. We understand that larger considerations of the cadre of the Political Department are involved in the maintenance of these posts of Assistant Political Agent. Subject to these, we recommend the adoption of the Agent to the Governor-General's proposals. Mr. Staig feels that the Agent to the Governor-General's proposals are generally speaking somewhat liberal. In regard to the Sibi district (area 11,187 square miles, population 143,000) where the Agent to the Governor-General considers that there is not the same necessity for a whole-time Assistant Political Agent at headquarters as elsewhere, it has been found necessary to create in the Nasirabad sub-division (area 821 square miles, population 37,000) for the general administration of which a post of Extra Assistant Commissioner exists, a temporary post of Assistant Political Agent for Colonization. The area to be colonized is 40,000 acres. This in Sind would form the charge of a Tahsildar. In the Zhob (area 10,300 square miles; population 58,000), it is understood that if the post of Assistant Political Agent were abolished, a post of Extra Assistant Commissioner would be required in connection with the administration of the Sherannis. The post of Assistant Political Agent is now held by an officer of nine years service in the Political Department (time scale pay according to the Foreign and Political Department list Rs. 1,200 plus Sterling Overseas Pay £25 per mensem and language pay Rs. 100). The incumbent may not always be so senior an officer, but the maximum of the Extra Assistant Commissioner's scale is Rs. 850. In the absence of stronger administrative justification than has been adduced to the Committee, Mr. Staig feels that a reduction in the status of the Assistant Political Agent's post is warranted. He therefore concludes that the posts of Assistant Political Agent in Sibi, Loralai and the Zhob should be abolished, and a post of Extra Assistant Commissioner substituted for the Assistant Political Agent, Zhob. In the alternative, he would support the Agent to the Governor-General's recommendation to the extent of two non-localised posts against the three he desires. Should exceptional circumstances arise it is always possible to obtain the sanction of the Government of India to the creation of a temporary post.

98. To the post of Political Agent in the Zhob whose headquarters are at Fort Sandeman which the Committee visited special pay of Rs. 300 per mensem is attached. Mr. Staig feels that in so far as he has been able to appreciate the district officers' work in that area in comparison with that in other parts of India with which he has some acquaintance, it is difficult to find justification for any special pay. While the area of the Zhob is over 10,000 square miles, its population is only 58,000. Nor, so far as he can judge, are the conditions of work there in any way more arduous, hazardous or unpleasant than in Bengal. He understands however that the local administration has submitted to the Government of India proposals for changes in the rates of special pay attached to certain posts in Baluchistan and that these include a substantial reduction in the special pay of the Political Agent, Zhob.

Signature of Members of  
the Frontier Watch and  
Ward Committee.

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A. E. B. PARSONS,  
B. M. STAIG,  
A. B. HAIG.  
*Major General.*

Dated New Delhi, the 5th December 1936.





